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The Politics of Inflation Management 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
An unanticipated and almost wholly unexpected coincidence of economic events 
occurred in Britain in July 2002.  Taken together, these raise serious questions about 
the stated rationale that has guided the conduct of British macroeconomic policy for 
at least a generation.  Yet they remained entirely unremarked upon in the financial 
and broadsheet press. 
On Monday, 15th July, the FTSE 100 index fell below 4,000 for the first time in 
5½ years, a full 43% below its peak of 6,950.6 reached on 30th December 1999.  
Before the London Stock Exchange opened for trading the next morning on Tuesday 
16th July, the Treasury announced the latest figures for the Retail Price Index measure 
of underlying inflation in Britain, which had fallen to an annual equivalent of 1.5%.  
This was the lowest figure on record since the Treasury first began to collect 
systematic Retail Price Index data amidst the inflationary experience of the early 
1970s.  Moreover, this was not merely a one-off, a statistical blip.  At the time of the 
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announcement, inflation in Britain had been below the Chancellor’s 2.5% target rate 
for all but two months of the previous three years.1
So, why is this particular coincidence of events of such significance?  To answer 
this question, it is necessary to look back at the strategy deployed by the Labour Party 
in its efforts to win the 1997 General Election.  In particular, we must revisit the 
extent to which it sought to capture for itself a reputation for governing ‘competence’ 
– which, in economic terms, it understood solely as a reputation for counter-
inflationary credibility. 
 
Labour acted as if the stock market were the primary arbiter of the Party’s 
reputation in this respect.  Any evidence of falling share prices on the expectation of a 
Labour victory was assumed to signify market concern about the strength of the 
Party’s counter-inflationary commitments.  Or, as proved to be the case, rapid 
increases in the value of the stock market in the immediate pre-election period, 
coupled with the general feeling that Labour would win, were taken to indicate that 
the markets were now unconcerned about the likely inflation performance of a Labour 
Government.  Low inflation and governing ‘competence’ were thus elided, with the 
stock market cast as judge of whether the prevailing inflation rate constituted 
evidence of a competent government. 
Moreover, this understanding of the relationship between stock markets and 
governments, which vested all sense of power in the former, was by no means 
confined to the British Labour Party.  It had also become commonplace within the 
academic literature to argue that markets had acquired a virtual veto over government 
policy.  It was assumed that the veto was enacted at those moments where co-
ordinated selling expressed the markets’ disapproval with governments who 
prioritised other policy goals over that of containing inflation.  However, it is 
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precisely such an assumption – namely, that share prices vary inversely, and 
automatically, with the markets’ inflationary expectations – which last July’s 
coincidence of events did so much to contradict.  At that time, the London futures 
market was trading at prices which suggested that investors were expecting little 
upward pressure on inflation for the following six months and, as such, little upward 
pressure on primary interest rates, which stood at a 38-year low of 4%.2  Yet this did 
nothing to arrest the prevailing slide in share prices.  Indeed, the slide continued in 
the months following July 2002.  On March 12th, 2003, a 4.8% fall in the value of the 
index took the FTSE 100 back below 50% of its 1999 peak.  It closed that day at 
3,287.0, almost 53% off its peak.3
Two points follow.  Firstly, it is clear from the foregoing that there is no simple 
technical fix for running a modern economy, whereby suppressed inflationary 
expectations lead to low interest rates, which in turn lead to opportunities for 
expanded wealth, as reflected in ever-rising share prices delivered by a satisfied stock 
market.  As a consequence, and contrary to the actions of successive British 
Governments over the past twenty years, the politics of inflation management cannot 
be reduced to a simple technical question of creating an appropriate institutional 
framework for suppressing inflationary expectations.  There is more to governing 
‘competence’ than merely delivering low headline inflation rates.  Secondly, the 
experience of inflation must be viewed as a distributional, and therefore highly 
political, issue.  While the headline rate of inflation has been both historically low and 
stable in Britain for some time now, the headline figure masks divergent price 
trajectories across different sectors of the economy.  Stable, and even falling, prices in 
some sectors exist alongside rapidly rising prices in other sectors.  The decision to 
allow certain assets to experience rapid price inflation within a generally benign 
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inflationary environment should be understood as an integral feature of the 
Government’s wider political strategy. 
My argument proceeds in two stages along these lines.  I focus primarily on the 
way in which Labour has built a large part of its future electoral prospects on being 
able to target specific constituencies, who have become wealthier on the back of 
Government policies that have led to buoyant share and house prices.  This strategy 
was eminently successful in 2001, as it delivered the material conditions that 
underpinned the Party’s second successive election victory.  It is in these markets in 
particular that asset price inflation exceeded the general inflationary trend during the 
first term of the Blair Government.  This, I suggest, is no mere coincidence.  Rather, 
it has been a deliberate part of Government strategy, intended to maintain its appeal 
to the new voters it captured in such large numbers in 1997.  The significance of last 
July’s economic events should therefore be apparent.  While the Government 
continues to run a macroeconomic policy geared to the successful suppression of the 
headline rate of inflation, this no longer appears to be tied so closely to an ensuing 
increase in the material well-being of its target constituencies via ever higher prices 
on the stock market.  This does not mean that the Government’s electoral strategy has 
become entirely self-defeating, although it does point to the possibility of 
contradictory tendencies within its economic policy.  I review that possibility, 
concluding that the politics of inflation management in Britain remain amenable to 
more progressive forms of political mobilisation – but only so long as Labour 
liberates itself from understanding economic governing ‘competence’ solely in terms 
of delivering a low headline inflation rate. 
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II. Inflation Management: The Orthodox View 
 
Perhaps the most notable theme of the academic literature on the 1997 General 
Election in Britain concerns the lack of competition over the direction of future 
economic policy.4
The important thing to note in this respect was that Conservative failure of 
macroeconomic management was made a matter of technical competence rather than 
one of ideology.  The crux of Labour’s attempt to prove that it was technically 
competent to run the economy came in its enthusiastic endorsement of the prevailing 
‘sound money’ orthodoxy.  In simpler language, this meant being seen to be tough on 
inflation. 
  Indeed, for most commentators, Labour’s electoral success 
appeared to be linked to its prior political success in defusing such competition by 
treating economic policy merely as a matter of competence.  In relation to one of the 
most frequently asked questions of the campaign, ‘Who’s trusted most on the 
economy?’, virtually all the opinion poll data pointed to the Labour Party.  
Furthermore, this was a distinctively ‘New’ Labour phenomenon.  While Labour held 
a narrow lead amongst all voters on the issue of perceived economic competence, 
amongst new Labour voters that lead was 4:1.  The party’s attempts to redefine the 
way in which it was seen by the electorate clearly resonated most strongly amongst its 
target constituencies of potential floating voters.  Here we see a party with a carefully 
constructed policy programme pitched directly at a pre-targeted social group whose 
support was deemed essential. 
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Justification for adopting such a stance was forthcoming at this time from the 
academic literature.  Driven by the perception that globalisation was changing the 
power relationship between financial markets and governments to the detriment of the 
latter, it was widely assumed that the scope of feasible economic policy had been 
significantly reduced.  Globalisation is conventionally linked to a substantial increase 
in feasible exit options for capital, as investors are more able than ever before to take 
advantage of market opportunities, wherever in the world they arise.  Investors who 
disapprove of the government’s policy priorities are considered likely to register their 
disapproval by re-locating an increasing amount of their assets overseas.  Capital is 
assumed to hold the upper hand in its relationship with the state, irrespective of the 
condition of globalisation, in that it is only through the successful reproduction of the 
capital accumulation process that the successful reproduction of the state can be 
ensured.5
The constraints on feasible policies are thought to be particularly pronounced 
whenever governments, or even prospective governments, reveal progressive political 
aspirations in their proposals for the economy.  Set in such a context, an obvious 
contrast is to be made between the reactions of the financial markets to the possibility 
of Labour victories in the General Elections of 1992 and 1997.  During the four 
weeks of the 1992 campaign, for instance, the headline FTSE-100 index of leading 
shares recorded a points loss equivalent to 7% of the market’s value.  The most 
substantial losses in that period came in the immediate aftermath of opinion polls that 
showed a strong Labour lead.  This reflected the fact that those shares whose 
underlying values were considered most susceptible to a change of government 
  Add to this the empowering effect of globalisation for capital and it tends 
to be further assumed that investors are able to impose their policy preferences on 
governments in a way which governments are simply not at liberty to reciprocate. 
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experienced a percentage fall which ran well into double digits.  By contrast, no 
similar cluster of ‘vulnerable’ shares emerged during the course of Labour’s surge to 
victory five years later.  The FTSE’s upward trajectory at that time was entirely 
undisturbed by the prospect of a Blair Government.6
However, my concern here is to caution against an unequivocal acceptance of this 
reading of events.  For, such a reading overlooks an important element of the politics 
of inflation management.  Taken to its logical conclusion, it suggests that the politics 
of inflation reduce simply to the search for efficient institutions to guide the conduct 
of policy.  Specifically, it is founded on the assumption that there is an inflationary 
bias originating within the political process, and that there is a technical fix for such a 
bias.  Inflationary outcomes are thought of as the product of institutionally 
‘inefficient’ policies: provide the correct institutional framework for overcoming such 
inefficiency and positive results will follow, both in terms of superior inflation 
performance and subsequent increases in personal wealth.
  This was largely due to there 
being no group of shares whose underlying values were considered susceptible to a 
change of government, and this in turn was primarily because a change of 
government was not thought likely to lead to a change of animating vision for 
government policy.  Labour’s erstwhile progressive political aspirations did not cause 
concern amongst the financial markets in 1997 as they had in 1992, because the 
Party’s leaders had used the intervening period to extricate themselves from such 
aspirations. 
7
Yet it is precisely such assumptions that last July’s coincidence of economic 
events did so much to undermine.  The Chancellor moved with haste in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1997 General Election to provide an institutional framework suited to 
the task of sustaining counter-inflationary credibility.  Primarily as the result of his 
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decision, taken within a week of coming to power, to cede operational independence 
to the Bank of England, the historic differential on long-term interest rates between 
Britain and other major European economies has fallen to zero – indeed, according to 
the Chancellor’s latest budget speech, beyond zero.8
[Insert diagram 1 about here – Source: calculated from Thomson Datastream 
figures.] 
  No clearer comment could be 
forthcoming from the financial community about the perceived strength of the 
Government’s counter-inflationary framework.  However, for much of the period 
since July 2002, the FTSE-100 index has been trading below the level that the Blair 
Government inherited when it first entered office in May 1997.  Despite the market’s 
rapid increase in value amidst all the excitement generated by expectations of a ‘new 
economy’ in 1999, all that additional value – and, therefore, wealth – has 
subsequently been lost again (see diagram 1).  Average wealth holdings in Britain, as 
secured through the value of stock market investments, are now no higher than they 
were six years ago.  This is despite all the Government’s efforts to introduce an 
institutional framework consistent with improved inflationary performance. 
This is important for three entirely different reasons.  Firstly, it tells us much 
about the character of the upward movement in share prices experienced in the late 
1990s.  Looking solely at the level of the headline index, it appeared that an 
increasing amount of capital had been pumped into the market as a whole, to keep it 
afloat with excess demand, which in turn served to inflate existing prices.  Investors 
seemed to be acting as if the broad range of market risks and returns had been shifted 
in the direction of a new lower-risk equilibrium – one consistent with suppressed 
inflationary expectations.  However, on closer inspection, this proves not to be the 
case.  Behind the overall increase in the value of the market index in the period 1997-
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1999, stock market investors appeared to be operating to two distinct logics.9
[Insert diagram 2 about here – Source: calculated from Thomson Datastream 
figures.] 
  On the 
one hand, for established firms without digital prospects, price to earnings ratios were 
forced down as investors demanded good news on profits as a sign that operating 
costs could be more than adequately recovered through the product market.  For these 
firms, there was no evidence at all that investors had reconfigured their perceptions of 
the risk/return structure of the market to reflect suppressed long-term inflationary 
expectations.  Here, the Government’s putative success in establishing counter-
inflationary credibility had no effect on the performance of the stock market.  On the 
other hand, for ‘new economy’ firms with digital prospects, price to earnings ratios 
rocketed to historic highs as investors overlooked adverse profits warnings and 
accepted that costs could be recovered through the capital market.  But, once again, 
this is not evidence that the risk/return structure of the market had shifted in line with 
lower levels of expected inflation.  It is merely evidence of a sector-specific share 
price bubble pushing the overall market index temporarily, albeit significantly, above 
trend (see diagram 2). 
Secondly, the headline rate of inflation may be a somewhat misleading figure.  
Certainly, without disaggregation, it tells us very little about the overall performance 
of the British economy.  Moreover, so long as the Government continues to target 
solely the headline rate, and so long as it continues to seek political capital for its 
current ‘competence’ in this endeavour, the impression remains that the politics of 
inflation management is a purely technical exercise.  However, focusing only on the 
headline rate allows divergent price trajectories in different sectors of the economy to 
be overlooked.  It diverts attention away from the Government’s decision to allow 
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certain sectors of the economy to experience significant price inflation, at the same 
time as introducing an institutional framework for inflation control that has led other 
sectors of the economy to experience price deflation.  It is necessary to look beyond 
the headline rate of inflation to understand more about the current distribution of 
inflationary tendencies within the British economy.  As a result, it is also necessary to 
treat the politics of inflation management as a distributional issue. 
Thirdly, when the politics of inflation management are recast in this way, it 
becomes clear that the material basis of Labour’s previously successful electoral 
strategy looks increasingly fragile.  Its strategy for re-election has been to combine a 
strict targeting of a historically low headline inflation rate with rapid price rises in the 
two sectors of the economy in which most of the recent increases in personal and 
household wealth have been concentrated.  These two sectors revolve around the 
stock and the housing market.  However, with share prices currently subdued, this 
leaves only the housing market to provide increases in personal wealth and, as a 
consequence, that electoral holy grail for any Government, the ‘feel-good factor’.  
Yet, the current trajectory of house price rises serves merely to exclude an increasing 
number of people from investing in property, and subsequently sharing in the 
additional wealth that is created by ever higher property prices.  This provides a 
qualitative limit to the number of people that Labour is likely to be able to incorporate 
into its currently successful electoral strategy. 
The remainder of the article focuses on points two and three above. 
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III. The Distr ibutional Consequences of Contemporary Inflation 
Management 
 
The academic literature is awash with the suggestion that ‘market sensitive’ 
policies of low inflation are now a functional necessity for the management of 
modern capitalist economies.  However, much less time has been expended on 
analysing the implications of increased ‘market sensitivity’ for the distribution of 
wealth and power within society.  It is clear that financial markets have a significant 
impact on the way in which society is organised, as the allocation of credit through 
financial markets is the sine qua non of distributional politics.  Financial markets 
have their most direct impact on the social distribution of wealth in Britain through 
their ability either to enable or to constrain access to investments in shares and 
property.10
The social basis of ‘market sensitivity’ therefore incorporates those who own their 
homes and those who have private investment plans concentrated in shares.  The 
Government’s innovations to create an institutional framework for delivering counter-
inflationary credibility, and in particular its decision to cede operational independence 
to the Bank of England, operate directly in the interests of these people.  Central bank 
independence provides not only an institutional guarantor of orthodox monetary 
policies, but also a political guarantor that the interests of a particular sector of 
society will be inscribed at the heart of the policy-making process.  For those with 
insufficient savings to be able to invest in either the stock or the housing market, the 
Government’s institutional framework for monetary policy provides a further 
constraint preventing them from sharing in the expansion in wealth that forms the 
material basis of Labour’s continuing appeal to the electorate. 
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For these people, any sense of enhanced material well-being is tied to the rewards 
that they can expect through the labour market.  Yet, if we disaggregate recent 
headline inflation figures by sector, there is bad news for those whose future well-
being is linked solely to likely wage increases.  The July 16th announcement of a fall 
in the annual headline rate of inflation to 1.5% masked two very different trends.  The 
Office for National Statistics data on which the Treasury’s announcement was based 
showed inflation in the services sector to be running at 4.5%.  By contrast, the goods 
sector was experiencing price deflation, with a reduction in the price of goods of 
1.6%.  The 6.1 percentage point difference in the rate of inflation between goods and 
services represented another record high.11
The prospect of wage rises within a goods sector experiencing price deflation 
appears bleak.  Firms can only finance higher wage payments in such circumstances 
should they be willing to sanction significant reductions in earnings.  However, the 
currently subdued state of the stock market makes this an unlikely strategy of 
corporate governance.  As part of the process of winding down the share price bubble 
of the late 1990s, investors have acted to force the market’s price to earnings ratio 
more closely into line with the historic average.  Firms that announce expected 
reductions in earnings to a market of this nature will tend to trigger further losses in 
the value of their share price.  As a result, it is much more likely that they will adopt 
an austere attitude within the wage bargaining process.  Consequently, in such 
circumstances, the scope for enhancing the sense of material well-being through wage 
rises appears to be severely restricted.  Thus, price trends within the goods sector 
serve to reinforce the divide between those who have access to expanded wealth 
opportunities within the stock and housing markets and those who do not.  ‘New’ 
 
 13 
Labour’s Britain contains very definite patterns of inclusion into, and exclusion from, 
the Government’s economic strategy. 
Moreover, the Government’s ability to incorporate new constituencies into its 
economic strategy is further constrained by the current divergent trajectories of the 
stock and housing markets.  As diagram 3 illustrates, the annual average increase in 
share and house prices in Britain between 1980 and 2002 is very similar.  The same 
cannot be said about the period that has followed the global stock market peak of the 
first quarter of 2000.  In that time, house prices have gone in the opposite direction to 
share prices, and both have increasingly exceeded their average rate of change since 
1980. 
[Insert diagram 3 about here – Source: The Economist Real House Price Index.] 
The impetus for these divergent price trajectories has been the performance of the 
stock market following the end of the tech-stock bubble.  Given the incentives for 
exploring alternative investments that the depressed nature of share prices has 
provided, more money has flowed into property.  The incentive structure faced by 
investors has been further skewed towards the housing market by the fact that 
primary interest rates are at a 38-year low, which in turn has made mortgages 
historically cheap.  Taken together, these factors have combined to make property the 
investment of choice for an increasing number of those who have sufficient access to 
credit to enter the housing market in the first place.  The result has been a surge in 
house prices.  As diagram 4 shows, average house prices in Britain are two-thirds as 
high again compared with when the Blair Government came to power in 1997.  
Moreover, the rate of change in house prices has accelerated markedly in the latter 
half of that period.  According to figures published in The Economist’s house-price 
indices, Britain has the highest house-price inflation anywhere in the world, with an 
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annual average of 20.8% in the year to July 2002.12
[Insert diagram 4 about here – Source: The Economist Real House Price Index.] 
  This represents a 13-year high, 
going back to the time immediately preceding the bursting of the last British housing 
bubble in the late 1980s. 
This has created both economic and political problems for the Government.  The 
highly localised nature of the housing market has led to particular geographic pockets 
of house-price inflation, notably in the South-East of England, but also now in and 
around other British cities.  This in turn creates an obvious impediment to the 
mobility of labour, which is clearly antithetical to the Government’s stated economic 
preference for labour market flexibility.  More and more people, due to the nature of 
the limited financial rewards that they can expect from their job, find that they are 
forcibly excluded from favoured sectors of the housing market.  This has been 
explicitly recognised by the Government in its attempts to subsidise property 
purchases for public sector workers in the London area.  Irrespective of the 
Government’s success in this respect, though, such a scheme comes nowhere near 
tackling the full extent of the political problem it faces.  The more that the prevailing 
trajectory of house prices excludes people from sharing the rewards that are currently 
available on the property market, the less able the Government is likely to be to forge 
into a self-reproducing electoral bloc those who rely on investment returns for their 
enhanced sense of material well-being. 
Two possible alternatives present themselves.  On the one hand, the Government 
could attempt to talk down the housing market.  However, it could only do this by 
suggesting that the balance of future interest rate risks is on the up-side.13  Yet, any 
indication that interest rates were set to move higher would hit an already depressed 
stock market, and could very well lead to the paradoxical situation of increasing the 
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incentive to concentrate assets in safer investments on the property market, thus 
leading to still higher house prices.  On the other hand, the Government could attempt 
to talk up the stock market as a means of encouraging investors to move out of 
property and back into shares.  But this would require a definite signal that interest 
rates were likely to move lower in the future, and it is the cheaper mortgages that 
have accompanied previous interest rate reductions that has been one of the key 
determinants of the house-price inflation of the last five years.  Again, the actual 
result could well be the exact opposite of that which was intended. 
The major difficulty for Government policy is that, given the current 
configuration of prices and earnings within the stock market, few incentives exist for 
switching the balance of investment portfolios back into shares.  At the time of 
writing, April 2003, both six-month and twelve-month FTSE 100 futures are trading 
at a level roughly comparable to where the index currently stands, and still below 
where it was in May 1997.14  This reflects the fact that most shares in the FTSE 100 
index continue to look overvalued in relation to the most recent projections of 
company earnings.  Contrast this to the previous two peaks in the ratio of house prices 
to personal income.  On both such occasions, the price to earnings ratio for shares 
was significantly below its historic average.  This made the stock market cheap in 
comparison to the housing market, circumstances which are not replicated in Britain 
today.  As The Economist concludes, “this means that house prices might continue to 
rise for a while yet”.15
If this is not bad enough for the Government to contemplate, then it should also be 
concerned about the situation of those who have recently purchased property as an 
  It also means that an increasing number of potential Labour 
voters are likely to find themselves excluded from the dynamics of wealth 
enhancement in the short to medium-term. 
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addition to their personal wealth.  The combination of low inflation and rapidly rising 
house prices has led to an equally rapid expansion in long-term household debt.  Low 
inflation may result in cheaper mortgages, but cheaper mortgages provide incentives 
for individuals to borrow more to fund their housebuying, at exactly the time that they 
are unable to rely on inflation to reduce the long-term value of their debts.  The last 
time that so many households were exposed to so much debt in Britain came during 
the house-price bubble of the late 1980s.  When that bubble burst, there followed a 
period of rapidly falling house prices, a sharp increase in negative equity, the 
evaporation of the ‘feel-good factor’ for a large proportion of the population, and a 
haemorrhaging of political support for the incumbent government. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that there is considerably more to the politics of 
inflation management than simply the successful targeting of a low headline inflation 
rate.  Indeed, it is necessary to review the entire way in which the Blair Government 
has attempted to secure for itself a reputation for governing competence.  It was 
certainly electorally expedient in the period surrounding the 1997 General Election 
for Labour to construct such a reputation on the basis of strict counter-inflationary 
credibility.  Yet, in continuing to follow that path so assiduously in the five years 
since 1997, unintended consequences of the Government’s electoral strategy have 
become increasingly apparent in the form of systematic imbalances in the structure of 
the British economy.  In turn, these imbalances may prevent the Government from 
incorporating sufficient numbers into its wider political strategy to enable it to sustain 
its current electoral ascendancy. 
The politics of inflation management in Britain are currently amenable to a 
variety of different forms of political mobilisation.  A more progressive politics of 
inflation management would challenge the whole basis on which the Government’s 
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understanding of ‘competence’ is grounded.  The Government claims to be displaying 
competence whenever the headline rate of inflation is at or below its central target 
rate of 2.5%.  At the same time, however, it chooses to remain silent on the way in 
which such targets are met.  Labour has introduced an institutional framework for the 
conduct of monetary policy that reduces the opportunity to experience enhanced 
material well-being through rewards from the labour market, while increasing the 
opportunity to experience enhanced material well-being through rewards from asset 
markets.  This clearly creates a social structure of accumulation that works in the 
interests of those who are already in the privileged position of having sufficient 
wealth to access asset markets in the first place. 
By contrast, were the Government to understand ‘competence’ in terms of 
introducing a greater semblance of sectoral balance into the British economy, it may 
also do much to eliminate the exclusionary political logic of its current method of 
inflation management.  Its first task should be to tackle the deflation in the goods 
sector, which would relax many of the economic pressures that are currently 
impacting upon the labour market and preventing higher pay awards.  This may well 
increase the headline rate of inflation – but it would also reduce, in two different 
ways, the level of household debt that has been generated by the recent, 
unsustainable, increase in house prices.  Firstly, the additional inflation would lessen 
the real burden of the debt.  Secondly, the higher incomes resulting from higher pay 
awards would lower the ratio of house prices to incomes from its current record high, 
thus ameliorating the worst excesses of the current house price bubble.  At the same 
time, it would have the added progressive political benefit of recasting the prevailing 
balance of social forces away from asset holders and towards wage earners. 
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However, this would all depend on the Government first publicly challenging its 
existing understanding of economic ‘competence’.  As a consequence, it would also 
mean making a decisive break with one of the cornerstones on which the Party rebuilt 
itself as ‘New’ Labour.  The dilemma can thus be simply stated: prioritise the short-
term political fortunes of the Labour Party by continuing to emphasise the 
Chancellor’s ostensible success in maintaining low headline inflation rates; or 
prioritise the long-term health of the British economy by seeking to correct its 
internal imbalances, which have been exacerbated by the strategies that have 
delivered such counter-inflationary ‘success’. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
Yet, even if the dilemma can be simply stated, the significance of the choice that 
it implies may be entirely overlooked by the Government.  If the Government truly 
believes its own diagnosis of the circumstances it faced prior to the 1997 General 
Election, no such choice will be deemed to exist.  The construction of a binary 
opposition between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Labour by the Party’s managers served to 
highlight the latter’s acceptance that the range of feasible policy options was heavily 
constrained in an era of heightened capital mobility and speculative asset pricing.  
More specifically, ‘New’ Labour presented its policy preferences in a way that 
mirrored its perception of the inflation preferences of the financial markets.16 
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However, there is reason to believe that the opinions of the financial markets are 
not the non-negotiable constraint that Labour cited as its principal guide for action in 
the build-up to the 1997 Election.  What is more, that reason comes from Gordon 
Brown’s most recent budget, delivered in April 2003.  Much of the contextual 
discussion contained within the Chancellor’s speech focused on the benefits the 
British economy was enjoying from the credibility that the Government had already 
established in the eyes of the financial markets.17
This returns us to the significance of the housing market.  It is within the housing 
market that we find the most profound economic and political pathologies of the 
imbalances of the current pricing structure of the British economy.  This was partially 
recognised by Gordon Brown in his most recent budget.  But his speech suggested 
that he understood the structure of the British housing market, not as a nascent 
political problem, but solely as a problem of macroeconomic co-ordination.  His sole 
reference in this respect was that: “most stop-go problems that Britain has suffered in 
  If credibility increases the room for 
manoeuvre and the Chancellor was correct in his claims, then such room already 
exists.  Moreover, to the extent that financial markets express an ‘opinion’ on a 
government’s macroeconomic performance at all, this is through the price at which 
assets are traded and their subsequent incorporation into wider investment portfolios.  
Yet, the only lesson to learn from the movement of prices on the London Stock 
Exchange during ‘New’ Labour’s tenure in government is their lack of correlation 
with the general performance of the British economy.  Nothing at the level of 
macroeconomic performance can explain the precipitous rise in share prices in the 
period 1997-1999.  Likewise, there was no direct trigger from the real economy to the 
stock market to explain the depressed state of share prices in the period 2000-2003. 
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the last fifty years have been led or influenced by the more highly cyclical and often 
more volatile nature of our housing market”.18
There is certainly a key difference in the structure of housing finance, as 
compared with all other European economies, which makes the British housing 
market particularly susceptible to augmenting and reinforcing the business cycle.  The 
repayment structure of most British mortgages, following a strictly limited period of 
fixed repayments, varies directly with short-term interest rates (i.e., when interest 
rates go up, so do mortgage payments).  It is this sensitivity of the mortgage rate to 
the interest rate that makes the British housing market more volatile than elsewhere in 
Europe, where housing finance is dominated by long-term fixed rate mortgages.  As a 
response, the Chancellor used his April 2003 budget to establish a commission whose 
task is to review the possibility of developing a market within British housing finance 
for long-term fixed rate mortgages. 
 
While this measure may help to alleviate some of the economic pathologies of the 
current structure of the British housing market, it will not arrest its political 
pathologies.  Much of the vitality of the British economy from the mid-1990s has 
been driven by rapidly rising house prices within the context of falling interest rates.  
This combination of an increase in the value of houses and a reduction in the cost of 
mortgage repayments creates what economists call a ‘wealth effect’.  The impact of 
the housing market’s current ‘wealth effect’ has been a sharp rise in equity 
withdrawal, through which homeowners increase their level of borrowing against the 
value of their house in order to sustain increases in general consumption.  The most 
recent estimates suggest that the additional consumption financed by equity 
withdrawal since Labour came to power has been responsible for at least a quarter of 
the increase in GDP in that period.19 
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Significantly, the ‘wealth effect’ also has a close political counterpart, the ‘feel-
good factor’.  It is through the additional consumption made possible by ‘wealth 
effects’ that Labour has been able to incorporate more and more people into a 
winning electoral bloc.  Those who have experienced the greatest increase in personal 
wealth from the housing market since 1997 have, on the whole, been willing to 
reward the Government with their continued support.  As a consequence, there would 
be a clear political impact of restructuring the mortgage industry in Britain so that the 
repayment on house purchases became increasingly concentrated in long-term fixed 
rate mortgages.  Such restructuring would eliminate the sensitivity of the housing 
market to changes in the interest rate, by dissolving the link between the interest rate 
and the value of mortgage repayments.  At the same time, though, it would also be 
sure to eliminate the significant ‘wealth effects’ that have been generated over the last 
ten years by the reduction of interest rates to a near forty year low, as well as 
eliminating the political ‘feel-good factor’ that has been created by the enhanced 
consumption possibilities facilitated by such ‘wealth effects’. 
The credibility that the Chancellor claims can thus be seen as something of a 
double-edged sword.  In the absence of the ability to appear credible when making 
counter-inflationary commitments, it is generally assumed that financial markets will 
severely restrict the policy autonomy of any government.  ‘New’ Labour certainly 
gave voice to such an assumption before it came to power, and it has continued to do 
so once in government.  Yet, the means through which it has secured a reputation for 
counter-inflationary credibility has, at the same time, injected other sources of 
imbalance and instability into the British economy.  As I have argued, these are 
perhaps most evident within the housing market, and they look likely to have both 
economic and political repercussions for the Government.  The economic 
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repercussions (i.e., the heightened sensitivity of the economy to movements in 
interest rates) may be at least tempered by internal changes to the market for housing 
finance.  However, the political repercussions (i.e., the problem of continuing to 
sustain the material basis of a successful electoral coalition solely through ‘wealth 
effects’) may be somewhat more difficult to withstand.  Indeed, these political 
repercussions may require nothing less than challenging the orthodox policy basis of 
the ideology of credibility on which the Government has relied so heavily in its 
attempts to construct a reputation for sound macroeconomic management. 
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